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HE cases in the partnership area (in keeping with our recent prac-
tice, we included limited liability company cases) decided during
this Survey period were not life-altering, but a few are worthy of
coverage. And, the bankruptcy courts continue to be a fertile source.
II. FIDUCIARY DUTY
Harwood v. FNFS, Ltd.'
Mr. Harwood spent some time with us last year 2 when we reported on
his unsuccessful attempt to obtain a discharge in bankruptcy. Harwood
was the president and 50% shareholder of B&W Finance Co., Inc., which
was the sole general partner of FNFS, Ltd. ("FNFS"1). 3 He is back, after
appealing the adverse result of his bankruptcy proceeding.4
Harwood challenged the bankruptcy decision on the two fronts that led
to denial of his discharge-whether he was a fiduciary to FNFS and
whether failure to file the deeds of trust was a defalcation. 5 The district
court 6 had no difficulty with the first issue, finding that, in addition to
fiduciary duties owed to B&W,7 Harwood owed a direct fiduciary duty to
* B.A., Southern Methodist University (with high honors); J.D., University of Texas
(with honors). Attorney at Law, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio, Texas.
1. In re Harwood, 427 B.R. 392 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2010), affd, 637 F.3d 615 (5th Cir.
2011).
2. FNFS Ltd. v. Harwood (In re Harwood), 404 B.R. 366, 406-07 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
2009).
3. Id. at 378, 379 n.15.
4. The bankruptcy court found that Harwood acted in a fiduciary capacity, and that
he committed a defalcation (having failed to record in the public records the deeds of trust,
thus creating liens on his real property pledged to secure funds borrowed by him, individu-
ally, from FNFS; therefore, based on U.S. Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(4), the court refused
to discharge this debt. Id. at 398-99.
5. The issues raised in a cross-appeal by FNFS were rendered moot by the court's
affirmation of the bankruptcy court decision. Id. at 399.
6. The court reviewed the basis for its jurisdiction and its procedurally sitting as an
appellate court. Id. at 395 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), (c)(2)).
7. Corporate directors and officers are generally considered to owe fiduciary duties
to the corporation. See Elizabeth S. Miller, Fiduciary Duties, Exculpation, and Indemnifi-
cation in Texas Business Organizations, in ST. B. OF TEx.: ESSENIALS OF Bus. L. 1 (2010),
available at http://www.baylor.edu/content/services/document.php/117971.pdf. ("The pro-
visions of the [Texas Business Organizations Code] governing for-profit corporations (like
the predecessor Texas Business Corporation Act), do not explicitly set forth or define the
fiduciary duties of corporate directors; however, case law generally recognizes that direc-
tors owe a duty of obedience, a duty of care, and a duty of loyalty.") "[I]t is relatively well-
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FNFS "because he controlled the daily operations of FNFS. '' 8 As pre-
dicted in last year's Survey discussion of the bankruptcy court decision
here and in another case McBeth v. Carpenter,9 McBeth and In re Ben-
nett10 (a case cited in both McBeth and in the bankruptcy court decision)
were invoked by the court to support a two-tier fiduciary proposition
without discussing any potentially-distinguishing facts, procedural pos-
ture, etc., in those cases. 1 ' The Harwood court additionally cited an
Oklahoma bankruptcy court decision for the proposition that "the sole
shareholder and director of a corporate managing partner owes fiduciary
duties to the limited partnership when he controls corporate actions.' 12
The argument that Harwood's situation was factually distinguishable be-
cause he was only B&W's President and not its sole shareholder (but a
50% shareholder) did not slow the court's finding that Harwood, individ-
ually, owed a fiduciary duty to the lower-tier entity FNFS. 13
In last year's Survey discussion of the bankruptcy court decision, we
expressed concern about imposing personal liability on an individual who
acted in a representative capacity for an entity designed to shield the indi-
vidual from that personal liability.' 4 It does not fit the historical and (we
suggest) reasonable expectations of the parties-that using a liability-lim-
iting organization within which to conduct one's business activities pro-
vides a protective shield from personal liability' 5-to so lightly reach this
result. In fact, it is distressing. Is it virtually impossible for the member
of a single-member limited liability company ("LLC") (by definition, the
person "in control") to carry on without fear of imposing personal liabil-
ity that the LLC shield was intended to avoid?' 6
The court agreed on the defalcation issue, that Harwood's reckless fail-
ure "to ensure that the deeds of trust securing his personal debt of more
than $800,000 were properly recorded" did, as found by the bankruptcy
court, constitute the requisite defalcation. 17 In reading this part of the
settled that officers will be held to the same duty of care standards as directors and that
sound public policy supports holding officers to the same duty of care and business judg-
ment standards as directors)." Id. at 3 (citing AM. LAW. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 cmt. a (1994)).
8. In re Harwood, 427 B.R. at 396.
9. 565 F.3d 171 (5th Cir. 2009).
10. 989 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1993).
11. Steven A. Waters & Matthew P. Reinhart, Partnerships, 63 SMU L. REV. 703, 705
n.17 (2010) [hereinafter "Waters & Reinhart"].
12. In re Harwood, 427 B.R. at 397 (citing Park v. Moorad (In re Moorad), 132 B.R.
58, 62-63 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991)).
13. Citing Schwager v. Fallas (In re Schwager), 121 F.3d 177, 186 (5th Cir. 1997), the
court said: "When the president of a corporate managing partner controls the partnership's
daily operations, the president owes a fiduciary duty to the partnership." In re Harwood,
427 B.R. at 397. Whether or not the results reached in these cases are correct, which is
debatable, control has been the central, common denominator of them.
14. Waters & Reinhart, supra note 11, at 705.
15. Elizabeth S. Miller, Are There Limits on Limited Liability? Owner Liability Protec-
tion and Piercing the Veil of Texas Business Entities, 43 TEX. J. Bus. L. 405, 416 (2009).
16. The cynical answer is to avoid "doing bad things, and everything should be just
fine." Not good enough.
17. In re Harwood, 427 B.R. at 398.
[Vol. 64
Partnerships
court's opinion, it was annoying to not know until the very end that there
were other creditors competing for the same assets covered by the unre-
corded deeds of trust. In the penultimate paragraph of the main part of
the opinion, the court finally noted that there was not only a failure to
record, but that Harwood pledged the same properties to another bank.1 8
Though sounding close to fraud, it may be that Harwood was speaking
completely truthfully when he said he left that recording job to another
B&W shareholder. The court found the combination of his failure to re-
cord, then not following up to ensure that the filing occurred, constituted
the "reckless failure" and therefore the defalcation. 19 The bankruptcy
court's decision to deny the discharge was upheld.20
III. PARTNER LIABILITY FOR PARTNERSHIP DEBT
Crane v. Samson Resources Co.21
Samson Resources Company ("SRC") was a general partner of Sam-
son Lone Star Limited Partnership ("SLS"), a Texas limited partnership.
SLS performed a seismic survey on Crane's property before drilling to
access subsurface minerals. 22 Only SRC, and never SLS, was a party to
this litigation.2 3
While the principal action was for breach of contract, the court deter-
mined that it did not have to interpret the contract because the partner-
ship issues were dispositive.24 Because Crane sought relief against SRC,
a general partner, Texas law required Crane to first obtain an unsatisfied
judgment against SLS, the limited partnership. 25
This case involved a variation on a theme covered over several years in
Survey articles, including 2008 and 2009:26 "Under what circumstances
can a partner be found liable for a partnership obligation, and how is
imposing that liability accomplished?" Yes, general partners are jointly
and severally liable for debts and obligations of a partnership;27 but, stat-
utory and procedural requirements must be met to impose that liability.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 398-99.
20. Id. at 399.
21. 356 F. App'x 683 (5th Cir. 2009).
22. Id. at 684.
23. Id. Apparently, there were earlier, failed state-court efforts to impose liability on
SLS. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 684-85 (citing TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.05(c) (West Supp.
2009)) [hereinafter "TRPA"].
26. Steven A. Waters & Bradley S. Carson, Partnerships, 62 SMU L. REV. 1345,
1345-47, (discussing KAO Holdings, L.P. v. Young, 261 S.W.3d 60 (Tex. 2008)); Steven A.
Waters & Peter Christofferson, Partnerships, 61 SMU L. REV. 995, 995-98 (discussing
KAO Holdings, L.P. v. Young, 214 S.W.3d 504 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet.
granted), affd as modified, 261 S.W.3d 60 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet.
denied) (where the Texas Supreme Court overturned the appellate court decision, effec-
tively holding that "service" on a general partner is more than a physical act of handing
over a piece of paper, and requires that the person be named as a defendant and be
served)).
27. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE AN. § 152.304 (West 2011) (successor to TRPA § 3.04).
2011]
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Unless a partner is directly, individually liable for the partnership obliga-
tion (such as where a partner signs a personal guaranty), than a judgment
must also be obtained against the partnership before liability is imposed
on the partner.28
Here, there was a very clumsy, failed effort 29 to impose liability on the
general partner for an asserted partnership obligation. SLS was never
even a party to this litigation. The plaintiffs tried to "save" their claim by
asserting that they sued SRC "as general partner in its partnership capac-
ity."'30 The court rejected the hail mary effort and affirmed the lower
court take-nothing-judgment. 31
Seidel v. Hospital Resources Management, LLC (In re HRM Holdings,
LLC)3 2
On a personal note, the author is pleased to report on a case authored
by his former partner, Bankruptcy Judge Stacey G. C. Jernigan. It is not
this case's holding that justifies its inclusion in this Survey-the court ba-
sically determined that the pleadings were wholly inadequate to support
the asserted claim (though the court reluctantly gave the bankruptcy trus-
tee another chance by allowing a third amended complaint). 33 Rather,
the court's discussion of the Texas veil-piercing statutes34 and a recent
Texas Supreme Court case dismissing the notion that Texas recognized a
"single business enterprise liability theory" 35 are what is of value here.
The case has a good discussion of these topics, and of replacing other
business organization statutes by the Texas Business Organizations
Code 36 and the pertinent effective dates of the replacement.
The goal of the veil-piercing claims here was to impose liability on five
non-debtor LLC parties for claims of creditors against the LLC-debtor. 37
A similar case on yet another variation of the seemingly-mushrooming
theme where an attempt to impose liability on those who organized the
ownership of business are personally shielded from liability by an entity
intended to afford just that protection.
Evanston Insurance Co. v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc.38
28. Id. § 152.306(b)(1) (successor to TRPA § 3.05(d)(1)).
29. Or, perhaps, it was just too clever-the plaintiff's earlier lack of success in impos-
ing liability on SLS may have unsettled him enough to launch this futile effort. See Crane,
356 F. App'x at 684.
30. Id. at 685 n.3.
31. Id. at 686.
32. 421 B.R. 244 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009).
33. Id. at 250-51.
34. The court identified those statutes as follows: "As earlier mentioned, Tex. Bus.
Corp. Act Art. 2.21 expires January 1, 2010. Sections A and B of article 2.21 have been
recodified in substantially similar form in Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 21.223 and
§§ 21.224-225, respectively." Id. at 249.
35. Id. at 248. The court briefly discussed the conclusion reached in SSP Partners v.
Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2008), that a single business enter-
prise theory "is inconsistent with what the Texas Legislature decreed in article 2.21 of the
Tex. Bus. Corp. Act." Id.
36. Id. at 246.
37. Id. at 245.
38. 602 F.3d 610 (5th Cir. 2010).
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For what appears to be a "little" per curiam decision, this one had quite
a bit going on in it. Not all the action is relevant here, but at least two
principal inquiries are: (i) if LLP status is lost between the time of a part-
ner's conduct and the time which judgment liability is established, is LLP
protection still available? and (ii) if liability is established against a part-
nership within the applicable statute of limitations, and then general part-
ners are sued individually after the statute of limitations expires for the
claim against the partnership, is the second action still valid?
To answer these questions, the court was required to develop the facts
and to construe applicable partnership statutes and the Texas Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code (TCPRC).39
Why this case went from a primary claim by an insurance company
against Dillard Department Stores40 to a cross-claim by Dillard against
two attorneys is not important to our discussion. 41 The essential facts are
that Dillard sued the law firm of Chargois & Enrster, L.L.P. ("CELLP"),
while the firm was registered as a limited liability partnership, for im-
proper use of Dillard's name and logo.42 Dillard obtained a judgment
against CELLP after the law firm's registration as a limited liability part-
nership with the Texas Secretary of State expired.
4 3
Dillard obtained a judgment against the law firm, but its efforts to col-
lect on the judgment were unsuccessful. Logically enough, it then pur-
sued the two partners, first filing a request for declaratory judgment that
they were liable and then in a "first amended complaint" 44 that sought to
impose personal liability on the two individuals. The court granted Dil-
lard's request for summary judgment against the two partners, jointly and
severally, and each lawyer appealed. 4
5
The court quickly dismissed the lawyers' due process argument-they
claimed that because they were not, individually, parties to the lawsuit
against their law firm, their due process rights to combat the claim were
denied.46
39. See id. at 617.
40. The claim was a request for declaratory relief that professional liability insurer
Evanston was not responsible for the claims brought against the CELLP. Id. at 612.
41. After these actions were mutually dismissed, all that was left was Dillard's claims
against the law firm. Id.
42. If you clicked on Dillard's logo on CELLP's website, you were directed to dillard-
salert.com, a website that alleged racial profiling by Dillard. Id.
43. The two lawyers in the firm had executed a document "dissolving" the partnership
several months before expiration for failure to complete the required annual renewal.
That private action had no effect on continuation of the lawsuit or the parties to it, and no
action was taken to substitute any parties in place of the "dissolved" partnership. Id.
44. Initially, the request for declaratory relief was styled as a third-party complaint,
presumably owing to original structure of the case. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 613. Curiously, that the opinion did not say anything about the lawyers
being served as general partners of CELLP in the action against the firm or anything about
their personal participation in the effort to defeat liability of the firm itself. Surely, some-
one was involved, other than counsel handling the case, on behalf of the law firm CELLP.
Instead, the court cited the lawyers' "vigorous" defense in the suit brought against them to
satisfy the judgment obtained against the firm. Id.
2011]
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The defendants' next argument was that each was individually immune
from liability as a partner, which they maintained was the case whether or
not their partnership was an LLP. Again, the court quickly identified the
joint and several liability that results under TRPA section 3.04, absent
applying one of two exceptions stated therein, the first under section 3.07,
which relates to the liability of incoming partners, the court found not to
be relevant. 47
Under section 3.08, the second exception houses the limited liability
partner provisions. Neither partner sought to avoid liability under sec-
tion 3.08(a)(2). 48 Instead, the lawyers argued that they were protected by
the partnership's being a duly-registered LLP at the time their infringing
website was up, while Dillard argued that "debt was incurred" when judg-
ment was entered against the partnership, at which time the LLP protec-
tion was gone (from failure to renew the registration) .49
The court agreed with the Dillard's interpretation that the debt in-
curred by the partnership (for which its partners were jointly and sever-
ally liable) occurred when judgment was entered, not when the initial act
(misuse of the Dillard's intellectual property) took place. 50 The court
compared the language of TRPA sections 3.08(a)(1) and 3.08(a)(2) and
said that: "The Texas legislature, when it so chooses, is capable of drafting
a provision that focuses on the commission of events that lead to liability,
rather than the fixing of consequent liability from those events. ' 51 By
comparison, section 3.08(a)(1) limits liability of a partner for debts and
obligations of the partnership that are incurred while the partnership is a
limited liability partnership. 52 Because the partnership was not a validly-
47. Id. at 614. The opinion did not discuss the theory proffered by the partners sup-
porting the non-LLP claim that they did not have general-partner liability for the partner-
ship debts under section 3.04.
48. Id. at 615 n.4. This subsection contains the exceptions to a non-acting partner's
protection from liability granted by section 3.08(a)(1) and includes liability (i) as the ac-
tor's supervisor, (ii) as a participant in the activity, and (iii) arising from having knowledge
and then failing to take steps to rectify the situation. Id. at 615.
49. Id.
50. The court said many things could have happened to the end that no "debt" was
ever "incurred" when the eye is on the time the act was committed, including that Dillard
may have chosen not to pursue the matter or it might have been found the act was not
improper. Id. at 615.
51. Id. at 615-16. The court quoted from TRPA section 3.08(a)(2), which says one
partner is insulated from liability for actions of another partner committed by that partner
"while the partnership is a registered limited liability partnership." Id. at 616.
52. Id. at 615 n.4. Subsection (a)(1) was added in 1997. Id. Interestingly, the court
noted that the comments of the 1993 Bar Committee, which on their face supported the
lawyers, referred to then subsection (a)(1), now (a)(2), and therefore referred to the wrong
section. That comment: "Subsection (a)(1) [now (a)(2)] clarifies that the partnership must
be a registered limited liability partnership at the time of the errors and omissions for
which partner liability is limited." Id. Dismissing that because it now refers to the wrong
subsection seems a bit disingenuous. Ultimately, the court could not reconcile the Legisla-
ture's use of "committed" in one place and "incurred" in the other without concluding that
they intended to produce a different result. Id. at 616. In effect, it likened the statutory
protection to that of a "claims made" liability insurance policy (which would support the
"committed" result), instead of an "occurrence" policy (supporting the court's view of
when the claim was "incurred").
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registered limited liability partnership at the time the debt was incurred
(that is, when the judgment against the partnership was entered), the
court found that the default liability under section 3.04 attached, making
each partner jointly and severally liable.5 3 Interestingly, the court points
out in a footnote that the district court avoided section 3.08(a) altogether
by finding liability on the basis that the two partners continued business
under the law firm name instead of winding up (after their mutual act of
"dissolution"), which the lower court characterized as "essentially ra-
tif[ying] the firm's debts."'54
Like the main issue discussed above in Crane, this case also included a
claim that the plaintiff did not follow the proper procedure to impose
personal liability on partners for a partnership debt or obligation. The
defendants claimed that TRPA section 3.05(c) required they be sued, in-
dividually, in the litigation against the partnership.55 TRPA section
3.05(c) provides: "A judgment against a partnership is not by itself a judg-
ment against a partner, but a judgment may be entered against a partner
who has been served with process in a suit against the partnership. '56
The defendants invoked KAO Holdings;5 7 however, unlike the plaintiff in
that case, Dillard had not sought the "two-fer" of establishing liability
against the partnership and the partners in the same litigation, which the
Texas Supreme Court made clear requires naming and suing the individ-
ual partners in the litigation against the partnership. 58 Rather, Dillard
first obtained a judgment against the partnership, and then pursued the
TRPA section 3.04 derivative liability of the individual partners for that
partnership debt.
The defendants' final attempt to pull their chestnuts out of the fire was
based on the statute of limitations. They maintained that their individual
conduct was the basis of the claim, which meant that the statute of limita-
tions had long run; however, the court properly rejected that argument.
First, the court stated that the four-year statute of limitations (not the
two-year tort/trademark claim statute of limitations) applied, and second,
the court restated that the statute began to run when judgment was en-
tered (a little more than three years before the third-party complaint was
asserted against the defendants).59
53. Id.
54. Id. at 616 n.8.
55. Id.
56. Id. (quoting TRPA § 3.05(c)).
57. Id. at 616; see supra note 26.
58. Evanston, 602 F.3d at 616-17. Though that result could be debated, based on the
language of the TRPA and TCPRC, and while the default judgment context of the original
case might have influenced the court's sense of fairness (as it clearly did the dissent in the
intermediate appellate court decision), the issue has been settled.
59. Id. at 617. Among other things, the court dismissed conflicting authority cited by
the lawyers (which the court characterized as a "nonbinding district court decision from a
[different] ... circuit") and, instead, relied on In re Jones, 161 B.R. 180 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1993). Id. at 617-18. The Jones court acknowledged that a partnership and partners could
be sued in the same action (the "two-fer" approach), but concluded: "On the other hand,




The earth did not move because of the partnership and LLC cases de-
cided during the Survey period, but some recent trends appear to be con-
tinuing, if not gaining momentum. These trends include: (i) finding
liability of a party, notwithstanding the existence of one or more layers of
liability-limiting entities, and (ii) how to impose liability on a general
partner for partnership obligations.
subsequent suit being filed against the partners on their personal liability for the partner-
ship's obligation." Id. at 618 (quoting Jones, 151 B.R. at 183-84).
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